Cybersecurity Best Practices and Risk Management Blog | HITRUST

Attackers Are Targeting Your Third-Parties. Paperwork Is Not a Defense.

Written by HITRUST | Nov 20, 2026, 3:12:28 PM

 “Check the box” TPRM isn’t reducing the risk, and attackers know it

Third parties are once again at the center of major cybersecurity headlines. JPMorgan, Visa, and Mastercard have each reported cybersecurity incidents involving third-party service providers. JPMorgan said attackers accessed certain marketing data held by vendors, potentially including customer names and email addresses. Importantly, the incidents did not require attackers to compromise the companies’ core systems or payment networks directly. The third party itself created the pathway to each of the financial service organization’s information.

At nearly the same time, in a November 13 FBI FLASH, the FBI issued a warning about the ARTEX autonomous penetration testing framework. ARTEX is “an open-source, large language model-driven agentic platform that threat actors have weaponized to automate multiple phases of cyber intrusions, from reconnaissance through data exfiltration”. In some observed incidents, attackers progressed from initial targeting to privileged access in less than three hours.

The FBI specifically identifies partner and supplier systems among the environments at risk and describes supply-chain compromise as part of observed ARTEX activity. One campaign involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup led to attempted sign-ins against more than 2,250 downstream customers.

These stories are different, but the message for third-party risk management (TPRM) leaders is remarkably similar: attackers continue to look for the weakest path into an organization, and increasingly that path may run through a third party.

Attackers are moving at AI speed. Your questionnaires don’t.

The more significant change is less about fundamentally new vulnerabilities or an entirely new attack workflow and more about speed and scale. Familiar activities such as reconnaissance, exploitation, and lateral movement are being executed across vulnerable third-parties at an increasingly faster pace.

That creates an important resource-allocation question for TPRM programs: As attackers are moving faster, can organizations afford to keep spending so much of their finite time administering assurance rather than reacting to threats and focusing on risk?

While questionnaires can be a tool for gaining information about a third-party’s perceived security operations, collecting evidence is not the same as creating reliable assurance. TPRM teams spend substantial time distributing questionnaires, chasing responses, and interpreting artifacts before they can determine what the evidence actually says about risk. Hundreds of completed questionnaires may state that a process was followed without demonstrating that the controls most relevant to current threats have been evaluated with sufficient rigor.

If your TPRM program (and customers) are spending too much valuable time managing the questionnaire process, the result can be a program that produces a tremendous amount of activity without a commensurate reduction in risk.

That inefficiency becomes more consequential during a large-scale cyber event. When a new vulnerability or attack campaign is disclosed, organizations need to identify which vendors are potentially exposed and whether existing assurance provides enough confidence to support a decision. Managing the third-party attack surface therefore requires knowing which vendors matter most and whether the available assurance provides sufficient confidence that those controls are working.

The ARTEX threat makes that problem more visible as it compresses the threat timeline, demanding more efficiency from your TPRM program.

When some observed attacks can progress to privileged access in under three hours, a TPRM program cannot depend on an annual exercise to provide confidence about third-party security. Faster threats require TPRM programs to be far more deliberate about which activities reduce risk.

Third-party Risk Is a Real-World Risk problem

The incidents involving JPMorgan, Visa, and Mastercard are reminders that third-party risk does not end with the security of an organization’s own environment. A vendor that holds customer information, operates a connected system, or has trusted access can create exposure even when the organization’s core infrastructure remains secure. Customers do not necessarily distinguish between a company and its vendor when a cyberattack occurs.

Instead of viewing third-party assessment primarily as an administrative process, TPRM programs must align their assurance requirements with the risks and attack techniques they are actually trying to address. The controls assessed should have a defensible relationship to the threats facing the organization and its third-party ecosystem.

An effective TPRM program connects the chain between real-world threats and informed risk decisions.


Connecting that chain requires understanding:

  • What access or information does this third party have? A vendor with privileged connectivity or access to sensitive data presents a very different risk than one with no logical connection or critical information.
  • Which threats are relevant to that relationship? Supply-chain compromise, credential theft, exposed cloud services and vulnerable internet-facing applications may warrant different control expectations.
  • Which controls materially reduce those risks? Assessment requirements should focus on controls with a meaningful relationship to the threat scenarios that matter.
  • How much confidence do we have that those controls actually operate as expected? An assertion that a control exists is different from independent evidence that it has been implemented and is operating effectively.
  • Does the assurance remain relevant as threats change? Assurance can quickly lose value when both the threat environment and technology landscape evolve rapidly.

When a significant cyber event occurs, TPRM teams should be able to use the above information to quickly determine which third parties warrant attention. A risk-aligned third-party approach can help organizations focus their effort on the controls and relationships that matter most. 

ARTEX is the latest example, not the last

The FBI’s ARTEX warning and the other attacks affecting third-party providers should not be viewed as isolated events. They are recent examples of a persistent pattern: attackers look for weaknesses across an organization’s extended ecosystem, while AI allows them to do so increasingly faster and at greater scale. The next example may involve a different tool, vulnerability, or vendor, but the underlying TPRM challenge will remain the same.

Organizations cannot respond to every new threat by stopping routine vendor assessments and launching a separate manual investigation. Nor can they assume that an annual vendor questionnaire will provide the timely, comparable insight needed during a fast-moving event. TPRM programs need a repeatable operating model that supports both conducting rigorous assessments and quickly determining how emerging threats affect the third parties on which the organization depends.

Managing your third-party attack surface therefore requires more than demonstrating that vendors have been asked a set of questions. It requires knowing which risks matter, which controls address those risks, and whether the assurance you're relying on provides sufficient confidence that those controls are working.

Because when attackers target the third party standing between them and your environment, checking the box isn't the same thing as reducing the risk.

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